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Continental Criminal Procedure:
"Myth" and Reality
John H. Langbeint and Lloyd L. Weinreb
In a recent issue of this Journal, Professor Abraham Goldstein and
Research Fellow Martin Marcus discussed their observations about the
criminal procedures of three European countries, France, Germany,
and Italy, as representative of the "Continental" or "inquisitorial"
model of investigation and prosecution.' Their inquiry was prompted,
they said, by a desire to probe claims that in those countries the extreme
form of prosecutorial discretion that produces plea bargaining and
pervasive reliance on guilty pleas in the United States is avoided by
greater judicial control and supervision of the process. They were con-
cerned also to find out to what extent judicial supervision of the in-
vestigation of crime obviates our after-the-fact efforts to deter official
abuses by the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained.2 Their con-
clusions are summarized in the title of their article: "Judicial super-
vision" is a "myth." The claim that Continental systems of criminal
procedure adhere to a rule of law more strictly than ours is based not
on fact but on "ideology" and "the assumption that officials adhere to
the ideology." 3 The prosecutor and, in their sphere, the police are
dominant in Europe as they are here; judicial responsibility is mostly
"reactive" to the primary roles played by other officials.4 The authors
advise that we Americans be skeptical and cautious about borrowing
from the models they describe.
We believe that Goldstein and Marcus have misinterpreted the most
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
+ Professor of Law, Harvard University.
1. Goldstein SL Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial"
Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977) [hereinafter cited without
cross-reference as Myth of Judicial Supervision].
2. Id. at 245-46.
3. Id. at 283.
4. Id. at 282.
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important characteristics of the procedures they intended to describe
and that their descriptions are substantially misleading. As they rightly
point out, persistent, deep dissatisfaction with criminal justice in this
country has led many people to wonder whether we might not learn a
good deal from practices elsewhere. We agree with them that the issue
should not be posed as "this model or that," as if criminal procedure
came complete in indivisible packages; nor should we ask ourselves
whether to adopt "the French system" or "the German system." At the
same time, we think that there is much to be learned from Continental
procedures, which, adapted to our circumstances, might be marked
improvements over what we have now. While Goldstein and Marcus
counsel caution and careful examination of the experience and re-
sults elsewhere, their own approach is neither cautious nor careful
and belies their counsel. Believing, as do the authors, that the matter is
important, we are impelled to write this brief statement of our dis-
agreement.
We make below some observations about French and German pro-
cedure; we do not comment specifically about Italian procedure, with
which neither of us is closely familiar. Our major disagreements are
general. Although the authors note that the offices of policeman,
prosecutor, and magistrate in the Continental systems are not defined
along the same lines as they are in the United States, they perceive the
comparable officials elsewhere as largely indistinguishable from their
American counterparts. They ignore or dismiss as insignificant all the
differences in the selection, training, and professional codes of the
foreign officials as well as the institutional structure within which they
work. That, of course, makes the conclusion that practices everywhere
are more or less alike almost inevitable. But it is not, as the authors
seem to assume, self-evident that the French procureur and German
Staatsanwalt are simply district attorneys who speak a foreign language;
that the French police judiciaire and the German Polizei are just the
homicide squad of an American city dressed in different uniforms;
that the juge d'instruction, the Richter, and the American trial judge
are, beneath the robe, one and the same. Apparent differences may, no
doubt, mask an underlying similarity of function and performance; but
that is something to be shown concretely in each case, rather than by a
presupposition that makes such differences irrelevant from the start.
Goldstein and Marcus proceed by setting up a model of Continental
criminal procedure to contrast with American "accusatorial" process;
in their model, prosecutorial discretion is either eliminated entirely or
"carefully controlled," and "full judicial inquiry . . . [is] made into
1550
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every offense formally charged." 5 Most of their article describes find-
ings in the countries they studied that conflict with the model. The
model, however, portrays inaccurately both the theory and the practice
in those countries. Indeed, there is not, as the authors suppose, a single
"model" to which the procedures of the three countries conform; the
differences among them are in many respects as important as the
similarities.6 Having found that their model is false, they conclude
that the reality must resemble practices in this country. Their con-
clusions, however, based mostly on conjecture about what "must be"
the underlying reality, are as far afield as the model they replace.
France
Taking the investigation of a case and the preparation of formal
charges by a juge d'instruction (the investigating magistrate) as the
prototype of French procedure, Goldstein and Marcus found that in
the majority of cases the reality is different. An instruction (magisterial
investigation) is required only for the most serious category of offenses,
crimes, and not for the much larger category of delits, which includes
not only our misdemeanors but also most of the less serious felonies.
7
Often the procureur, who is responsible for the decision to send a case
to a juge d'instruction, ignores evidence that an offense should be
prosecuted as a crime and qualifies it as a delit, which is then sent
directly to the court (tribunal correctionnel) for trial and judgment.8
5. Id. at 244.
6. The theory of judicial investigation, for example, which looms so large in the
model that Goldstein and Marcus attack, is characteristic of the procedure in France and
Italy but not Germany, where judges do not have responsibility for pretrial investigation.
Goldstein and Marcus describe the elimination of the institution of the Untersuchungs-
richter from the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1975 as "the abolition of the examining
magistrate in Germany." Id. at 249. The implication is that the Germans were previously
operating a system of judicially conducted pretrial examination like the French. In fact,
examination by Untersuchungsrichler was not a regular phase of German procedure,
but only an option available on motion of the prosecution or defense in certain very
serious or complex cases, primarily in order to preserve sworn evidence. See STRAF-
PROZUSSORDNUNG (Code of Criminal Procedure) §§ 178-180, 188 (repealed 1975) [hereinafter
cited as SrPO]; id. § 251 (1977) (authorizing receipt of judicially conducted examinations).
The procedure was seldom used. Its abolition did not, as a reader of Goldstein and
Marcus might infer, "replace" (lyth of Judicial Supervision at 249) a magistrative pretrial
system with a prosecutorial one.
7. Crimes are those offenses punishable by imprisonment for more than five years. C.
PEN. arts. 1, 6-7, 18-19 (72e ed. Dalloz 1974-75). Ddlits generally are punishable by im-
prisonment for more than two months and not more than five years. C. PEN. arts. 1, 40
(72e ed. Dalloz 1974-75). There is also a category of petty offenses called contraventions,
punishable by not more than two months' imprisonment. C. PEN. arts. 1, 465.
8. The Cour d'assises has jurisdiction over crimes. C. PR. PEN. arts. 214, 231 (16e ed.
Dalloz 1974-75). The tribunal correctionnel has jurisdiction to judge delits. C. PR. PEN.
art. 381 (16e ed. Dalloz 1974-75). The tribunal de police has jurisdiction over contraven-
tions. C. PR. PEN. art. 521 (16e ed. Dalloz 1974-75).
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This practice of "correctionalization" reduces still further the number
of cases prepared by an investigating magistrate.
Goldstein and Marcus regard the small proportion of cases sub-
mitted to a juge d'instruction, and the practice of "correctionalization"
in particular, as a departure from the "model" of French criminal
procedure; they strongly intimate that, at least at a theoretical level,
the failure to conduct a judicial investigation in most if not all cases is
improper and to be regretted.9 That view reflects their preoccupation
with their own false model. An instruction is not prescribed even in
theory if the charge is for one of the less serious offenses and further
investigation does not appear to be necessary.' 0 While it is undoubtedly
true that the procureur "correctionalizes" offenses in order not to
burden the process with an instruction in too many cases, his decision
to do so does not evade a required procedure. One may believe that
charges and convictions in France are too lenient; whether that is so or
not, persons charged with ddlits are not denied an investigation they
ought to have had.-" Indeed, as Goldstein and Marcus note, when a
case has been "correctionalized," the accused can challenge the jurisdic-
tion of the tribunal correctionnel and urge that the case be examined
by a juge, in which case it may be qualified as a crime.12
One might use the distinction between crimes and ddlits and the
procedures required for each to make a point quite different from what
the authors suggest: when the responsible state official believes that the
9. See Myth of Judicial Supervision at 250-51.
10. C. PR. PEN. art. 79 (16e ed. Dalloz 1974-75). The point is made plainly in the
standard French treatises on criminal procedure. For example: "Les juridictions d'instruc-
tion ont un r6le trits important, mais limit6 A certains types d'infractions: en droit
franais, en effet, l'instruction pr paratoire n'est obligatoire que pour les crimes, qui sont
tout de mfme une chose relativement rare; elle est facultative en matiire de d~lits cor-
rectionnels et exceptionnelle pour les contraventions de police." 2 R. MERLE & A. VITU,
TRAITE DE DROIT CRIMINEL 196 (2e ed. 1973); see G. STEFANI & G. LEVASSEUR, PROCEDURE
PENALE 32 (9e ed. 1975).
11. Merle and Vitu, like other French commentators, observe that although the prac-
tice of "correctionalization" is accepted by everyone, it is beyond the legal competence of
the Procureur. They point to various harmful effects of the practice: e.g., uneven sen-
tencing, weakening of the deterrent effect of the criminal law, discouragement of the
police, and distortion of the statutory definition of offenses. 2 R. MERLE & A. VrTu, supra
note 10, at 563-64. Such criticism of "correctionalization" is quite different from the claim
that an offense qualified (rightly or wrongly) as a ddlit and not unusual or complex ought
to be submitted to a juge d'instruction.
12. C. PR. PEN. art. 659 (16e ed. Dalloz 1974-75). The victim of a crime, who may
appear in the case as partie civile can also challenge "correctionalization." Likewise, if the
victim files a complaint as partie civile before the juge d'instruction, "correctionalization"
is forestalled. C. PR. PEN. arts. 85, 86 (16e ed. Dafloz 1974-75). The tribunal correctionnel
may reject the qualification of an offense as a ddlit if there appear to be facts that in-
dicate commission of a crime. C. Pa. PEN. art. 469 (16e ed. Dalloz 1974-75). As Goldstein
and Marcus state, Myth of Judicial Supervision at 253, "correctionalization" is rarely dis-
turbed. See generally 2 R. MERLE & A. VITU, supra note 10, at 563-64.
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investigation of an offense is incomplete, and in all cases in which the
state intends to prove a major offense, there is an investigation under
the direction of a magistrate. The lesson that we might draw from the
French experience is that we should be skeptical of any proposal for
elaborate post-crime investigation in all cases, not that judicial in-
vestigation, limited to cases in which it is most likely to be valuable, is
a myth. The false model of a judicial investigation in every case takes
our attention away from the question we ought to ask: whether the
procedure actually provided in France for the large number of delits
is preferable to ours in comparable cases.
Most of the time, the authors observe, the procureur himself does
little investigation even when a case is not submitted to a juge d'instruc-
Lion. Like an American prosecutor, he usually relies on evidence
gathered by the police and presented to him in the dossier of the case.
So, they say, "the overwhelming proportion of delits is likely to proceed
to trial with a dossier that is little more than a police report."'1
Similarly, the juge relies heavily on the work of the police for in-
vestigation of a crime that is not especially serious or complex. The
authors conclude that whether one speaks of ddlits or crimes, "[b]ehind
the veil of the formal requirements of the Code, the French dossier,
the manner in which it is compiled, and even its contents may not be
as different from an American prosecutor's file as is commonly
supposed."' 4
In France, as in the United States, ordinary crimes are "solved"
mostly on the basis of evidence that police gather routinely as part of
their initial response at the scene of the crime. In such cases, it is a
matter of course that investigation is largely completed before the case
reaches the procureur; that he or the juge d'instruction ordinarily
relies on the information provided by the police is likely to surprise
only those who have taken judicial investigation as the invariable
standard. French procedure prescribes nothing to the contrary. One
who is familiar with American police work, however, will be misled by
the statement that the French dossier is "little more than a police re-
port." In this country, a "police report" is primarily an internal police
document, the report of an incident that called for some response by the
police and, if the incident was criminal and someone was arrested for
the crime, a record of how it was cleared. The police are not ex-
pected to provide a legally competent basis for prosecution and
conviction. The preparation of the report is subject to no prosecutorial
13. Myth of Judicial Supervision at 255.
14. Id. at 255-56.
1553
HeinOnline  -- 87 Yale L.J. 1553 1977-1978
The Yale Law Journal
requirements of form or content; it is used by the prosecutor, if at all,
only as an unofficial document without evidentiary significance. The
French dossier, on the other hand, is prepared and intended to be used
as part of the evidentiary basis of the judgment. In their capacity as
police judiciaire-which Goldstein and Marcus summarily dismiss as
a fiction'5-French police are expected to prepare an investigative
record that is complete and formally correct, available to the defense
as well as the prosecution, and able to withstand a searching examina-
tion. 16 If the dossier is inadequate to prove the commission of an of-
fense, unless the case is dropped it must be turned over to a juge
d'instruction for further investigation. Of course, a dossier is more
easily compiled if the facts are uncomplicated and beyond dispute than
if they are not. In the easy cases as well as the hard, the dossier of a
French case, crime or delit, ordinarily provides a permanent record of
both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence that is substantially superior
to anything regularly available in this country short of a trial transcript.
Goldstein and Marcus' specific comments about the investigative
responsibility of the French police do not concern the adequacy of the
investigative record, but rather the lack of "judicial" oversight of police
illegality. Again they observe that their model of judicial supervision
of investigations has limited application-as it must unless police are
to be accompanied by magistrates when they go to the scene of a crime.
Beyond that, the authors are surprised by the lack of effective "review
after the fact." The French juge d'instruction and the courts rarely in-
quire into the legality of police conduct; although they have authority
to "nullify" an illegal act, they rarely do so in the manner of this
country, by excluding illegally obtained evidence.' 7
To a considerable extent, this simply makes the point that the ex-
clusion of evidence is not applied as a remedy for police misconduct in
France as it is here. Whether or not the exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence is desirable, the late and faltering resort to that remedy in
this country8 shows that it is not an essential characteristic of one pro-
cess more than another. In England, where criminal procedure more
15. Id. at 249.
16. See, for example, C. PR. PEN. arts. 53-74 (16e ed. Dalloz 1974-75), which specifies the
investigative responsibilities of the p.olice judiciaire with respect to those crimes and
ddlits flagrants that the police have authority to investigate without judicial direction. See
generally 2 R. MERLEr 9- A. VITU, supra note 10, at 249-50.
17. Myth of Judicial Supervision at 254-55.
18. The rule with respect to unlawful searches was not applied to the states as a con-
stitutional matter until 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Since Mapp, both in
principle and in practice, exclusionary rules have not been an unalloyed success. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ceccolini, 98 S. Ct. 1054 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)
(limiting application of exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment cases).
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closely resembles ours, the automatic application of an exclusionary
rule has consistently been rejected.19 There are also differences between
French and American law concerning what police practices are per-
missible, which have nothing to do one way or another with the choice
of procedures for prosecution. A greater degree of force and, in our
terms, abuse by the police is tolerated in France than is tolerated here,
an aspect of the generally more authoritarian relationship between the
state and the individual. The French code, for example, expressly
authorizes under certain conditions the kind of custodial interrogation
that, at least before Miranda,20 was carried out by police in this country
without any authorization at all.21 We should not compare conduct
that is lawful in France with conduct that is unlawful here and then
conclude that, because it would be unlawful here, it is irregular and
unsupervised in France.
For all their apparent disapproval of French police practices, Gold-
stein and Marcus say nothing to indicate whether or not French police
are generally responsive to the rules circumscribing their authority.
Unaccountably, the authors do not mention that in the performance of
criminal investigations, the French police are subject to the super-
vision and control of the magistracy (the procureur in particular).22 The
procureur makes regular evaluations of the police officers subject to
his supervision, which become part of the officers' official record.
There is thus the framework for direct bureaucratic control of the
police, for lack of which in this country we have had to depend on the
dubious deterrent effect of exclusionary rules. That control is far from
perfect and is much criticized by the French themselves; 23 it is
evidently less successful than the German bureaucratic structure that
19. See, e.g., Jeffrey v. Black, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 895 (Q.B.), [1978] All E.R. 555.
20. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
21. In certain circumstances, the French police are allowed to detain a person for in-
terrogation for 24 and sometimes 48 hours, under prescribed conditions. The practice is
called the garde it vue. C. PR. PEN. arts. 63, 77 (16e ed. Dalloz 1974-75); see Myth of
Judicial Supervision at 253. In this country the Miranda rules may not have prevented
police questioning so much as imposed some formal requirements on it. To the extent
that this is so, our current practice has certain similarities to the garde t vue, although
it is quite rare that detention for questioning is as prolonged here as it may be in France.
22. E.g., C. PR. PEN. arts. 12, 13, 19, 54, 56, 63-64, 68, 75 (16e ed. Dalloz 1974-75); see
generally 2 R. MERLE 9: A. VITU, supra note 10, at 253-54.
23. The same police who function in one capacity as police judiciaire commonly
function in other capacities, such as peace-keeping, as well. When their investigative work
is not pursuant to judicial authorization, as when they are responding directly to the
scene of a crime, it is difficult to separate their responsibilities in their various capacities.
The lines of bureaucratic control are badly defined, because supervision is shared among
the governmental agencies concerned with the various policy functions. See generally 2 R.
MERLE & A. ViTU, supra note 10, at 222-43.
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it somewhat resembles. 24 But to ignore it altogether makes comparison
worthless.
The concept of "judicial police" that Goldstein and Marcus dismiss
as a fiction is not intended to suggest that the police are magistrates
but that, however imperfectly, the investigative functions of the police
are integrated into the criminal process and responsive to its demands,
rather than to an entirely separate definition of their role. There is far
more to be learned from the strengths and weaknesses alike of the in-
stitutional structure of the French police and its relationship to
criminal prosecution than we are told simply by a comparison of ex-
clusionary rules there and here.
The absence of direct judicial supervision of criminal investigation
in France is not repaired, Goldstein and Marcus believe, by the trial.
Although in theory the trial is "an active inquiry by the court into the
defendant's guilt,"25 for the "simpler and more routine cases,"20 which
are the majority, the Continental trial is, they assert, scarcely dis-
tinguishable from the entry of a guilty plea before a judge who con-
scientiously inquires into the basis of the plea before accepting it. The
authors, however, say scarcely anything about the conduct of a French
trial except to note that proceedings in the tribunal correctionnel may
be swift, even "perfunctory," if the accused does not contest his guilt;
in such cases, "the key to the sufficiency of the evidence and accuracy
of the charge lies more in the dossier than in the trial itself."2 7
Goldstein and Marcus do not suggest that a searching inquiry of
contested facts is not available to an accused charged with a crime or a
ddlit. Rather they claim that an accused is subject to pressure com-
parable to that of plea bargaining in this country not to contest the
charges. Just as here, they say, dispositions are "plainly affected by
what the prosecutor or judge may do for the accused, and what he may
do for them."'12 8 Most of their concrete observations about French prac-
tices, however, point the other way. They note that procureurs con-
sistently deny that they engage in practices comparable to plea bar-
gaining.
[Procureurs] insist that they do not reward confessions and co-
operation with a favorable exercise of their discretion not to
charge. They express suspicion of informers and hostility toward
24. See p. 1560 infra.
25. Myth of Judicial Supervision at 265.
26. Id. at 268.
27. Id. Goldstein and Marcus' references to the dossier in this part of the discussion
considerably undercut their earlier suggestion that it is comparable to an American police
report.
28. Id. at 270.
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bargaining and profess to leave considerations of mercy to the
courts. The system gives them the authority but not the inclina-
tion to drop the cases of helpful offenders; historic deference to
the judge predisposes prosecutors to send cases on for trial and
whatever amelioration the court may provide. 29
Nor does any of their information from other sources contradict the
procureurs' description. The authors report that while there may be
"conversations between prosecutor and defense counsel . . . there is
little or no talk of 'trading' a confession for the reduction or 'correction-
alization' of the charges."' 0 In sharp contrast with this country, where
prosecutors and defense counsel acknowliedge that they bargain and
defense counsel in particular often assert their special ability to obtain
a favorable bargain, in France plea bargaining is contrary to practice
and to professional ethics alike.
How then do Goldstein and Marcus conclude that plea bargaining,
or a close analogue, is a part of the French process? Aside from some
general observations that in Europe, as here, a prosecuting official may
have the power to deal leniently with an accused who cooperates, they
rely entirely, despite what they were told, on the practice of "cor-
rectionalization": when the procureur "correctionalizes," "he is, in
effect, offering an accused a lesser sentence for a delit in exchange for
a waiver by the accused of the full process that he would have if he
were charged with a crime."3'
This account of "correctionalization" as crypto-plea-bargaining would
be unrecognizable to the persons who are supposed to engage in it.
Starting once again from their own model, Goldstein and Marcus
describe the situation of a French accused as if he were entitled to a
judicial investigation, which he sacrifices in exchange for the certainty
that his sentence will not exceed that prescribed for a delit. He is thus
made to resemble the American defendant who gives up a trial for
some benefit in sentencing. But it would startle all of those involved,
the accused not least, to suggest that he has given up something when
he does not insist on being prosecuted for a more serious offense. In
France, unlike the United States, the seriousness of the accusation does
have a bearing on the process of prosecution, and that has nothing to
29. Id. at 277 (footnote omitted).
30. Id. at 269.
31. Id. at 277. Perhaps not quite convinced themselves that "correctionalization" is as
close an analogue of plea bargaining as they suggest, they add: "And the German ex-
perience suggests that if French prosecutors are as inflexible as they claim, the French
police may be exercising more discretion in charging than officials there admit." Id.
(footnote omitted). Even if we credit such evident conjecture, it has little to do with
plea bargaining.
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do with the accused's acceptance of a deal. 2 The procureur makes the
decision to "correctionalize" without discussing it with the accused or
his lawyer. The accused ordinarily has no reason to suppose that the
more elaborate proceeding for a crime would give him an advantage,
lost if he pleads guilty, comparable to the American defendant's chance
for an acquittal.
Unlike the American defendant who pleads guilty, a French accused
who accepts "correctionalization" of the offense is not bound to accept
the prosecution's evidence against him. No doubt an accused sometimes
cooperates, in a sense unwillingly, because he hopes to benefit in some
way. But his cooperation is not a condition of "correctionalization"
explicitly or implicitly. The accused can, and often does, put the
prosecution to its proof. He can claim his complete innocence of the
charges, question the evidence against him, and present his own,
without risking the loss of his side of the supposed bargain. In sharp
contrast, the American defendant risks rejection of his guilty plea
unless he corroborates the charges. 33 Before the tribunal correctionnel
as much as before the Cour d'assises, which judges crimes, conviction
depends on the proof of guilt contained in the dossier and presented to
the court.
Part of the explanation for Goldstein and Marcus' Americanized ac-
count of French criminal procedure is their overriding presupposition
that investigative and prosecutorial functions are necessarily separate
from judicial functions and cannot be performed with the attributes
that we associate with the latter. So they assume that the "judicial
responsibility" for which they were searching can only mean super-
vision by a judge of other officials, the police and prosecutors. The
possibility that "judicial responsibility" might in some respects be
provided by a redefinition of roles and integration of functions is
ignored. Insistence that, in this context, a rose is a rose is a rose makes
good sense if one has exclusively in mind the American criminal pro-
cess. Not only are the prosecutorial and investigative functions separate
from the judicial function in this country, but it is also a matter of
32. See p. 1551 suPra.
33. Goldstein and Marcus state that an American judge who carefully makes the re-
quired inquiry into the "factual basis for the plea" before accepting it conducts "a brief
'inquisitorial' inquiry that bears striking similarities to the uncontested Continental trial."
Myth of Judicial Supervision at 268-69. We question whether many judges do regularly
review the prosecutor's files, question witnesses, or examine the defendant as thoroughly
as Goldstein and Marcus suggest. Even if that is sometimes the case, many American
observers wonder whether such inquiries do not simply oblige the defendant to lie so far
as is necessary to induce the judge to accept the plea. Unlike the French accused, an
American defendant who wants to plead guilty has everything to lose by asserting himself.
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principle that they be kept so. It is just that principle of separation,
however, that has been rejected in France by long tradition. There are
substantial links between prosecutorial and judicial functions unlike
the alignment here, where district attorney and defense counsel share
a common function as lawyers that is distinguished sharply from the
role of a judge. Both the procureurs and the juges d'instruction are
part of the magistracy, the former called magistrats du parquet and
the latter magistrats du sitge. Magistrats receive professional training in
common, which includes the work of both branches of the magistracy
and is distinct from the training of private attorneys. Magistrats of both
types belong to common professional associations. Over the course of
their careers, it is not uncommon for magistrats to change office from
magistrat du parquet to magistrat du siege, and the reverse.3 4 Gold-
stein and Marcus disregard all of this, evidently because it is a "resort to
fictions" to assert that the procureur is anything but an American
prosecutor. We do not suggest that the combination of investigative or
prosecutorial functions with judicial functions be approved or imi-
tated uncritically. It is one thing, however, to conclude on the basis
of close observation that such combination has been, or is likely to be,
unsuccessful, quite another to label it a "fiction" and let it go at that.
Germany
Goldstein and Marcus observe that in Germany the police perform
most criminal investigation. Once again they note that the American
remedy of excluding evidence illegally obtained by police is not
followed. Therefore, they conclude, "pretrial investigation follows Code
requirements only as much as the police choose to adhere to them."30
While they add that the requirements "take their force through the
degree of obligation felt by the police to follow legal rules,"37 they say
34. 2 R. MERLE & A. Vrru, suPra note 10, at 202.
35. Some critics of Continental procedure believe that if the prosecutor acquires some
judicial attributes, it is also likely that the judge will acquire some of the attributes of a
prosecutor and lack the neutrality that a judge ought to have above all. That has been a
serious concern in France and some other countries, a partial response to which has been
an effort to increase the independent responsibilities of defense counsel along the lines of
our accusatorial model. Undeniably, an effort to "judicialize" the prosecutor's function in
this country without guarding carefully against an unintended reverse effect would be
ill-advised. The judicial role need not be conceived as indivisible; combining prosecu-
torial and judicial attributes at some stages of the process for some purposes does not
entail a similar combination at other stages involving different officials.
36. Myth of Judicial Supervision at 262.
37. Id.
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nothing about the carefully developed institutional framework for
ensuring that the obligation is not only felt but is honored.
German police forces are relatively large, they are organized or co-
ordinated from the state level, and they have many grades of rank and
compensation. Each force follows meritocratic promotion policies, for
whose good order the parliamentary minister of the interior for that
state is responsible. This system gives the policeman a direct incentive
to avoid generating citizen complaints that will remain in his personnel
file throughout his career. There is an extensive statutory procedure,
including provisions for both administrative and judicial sanctions, for
investigating complaints of misconduct. A designated departmental
superior is obliged to investigate any citizen complaint and to state
reasons for his conclusions. The complainant can secure review of this
action by laying a fresh complaint with the next higher departmental
superior, who must also justify his conclusions in writing. The require-
ment of a written statement of reasons at each level is meant to deter
intradepartmental coverups. When a complaint is sustained, sanctions
ranging from rebuke to dismissal with loss of pension rights may be
imposed.38
When the policeman's conduct has violated the criminal law, the
citizen makes his initial complaint to. the public prosecutor, 9 and
disciplinary proceedings usually take place after the criminal proceed-
ings in the ordinary courts have been completed. Americans are ac-
customed to regard criminal proceedings as a virtually hopeless remedy
for police misconduct. Consider, however, the stern German handling
of the case of Otto N-, a policeman in the state of Baden-Wiirttem-
berg, who was investigating a complaint against a teenage boy alleged
to have shot a neighbor's cat with an airgun. There was considerable
evidence against the boy but he resisted confession. In the course of
interrogation at the police station the policeman first slapped the boy
and then punched him a number of times. The boy's father instituted
38. In Baden-Wilrttemberg, for example, the superior may in a less serious case impose
(1) a warning, defined as an official disapproval accompanied by an instruction to the
offending officer to avoid the disapproved conduct in the future; (2) official censure; or
(3) a fine not to exceed one month's salary. These sanctions are entered on the personnel
file of the policeman and will affect his prospects for promotion and job preferment. In
more serious cases the departmental superior must take steps that will bring the matter
before the disciplinary chamber at the administrative court. The available sanctions in-
clude (1) reduction of salary by as much as one-fifth for as long as five years; (2) denial
of otherwise applicable salary increases; (3) demotion to a lower rank; (4) dismissal; and
(5) reduction or denial of pension rights. LANDESDISZIPLINARORDNUNG §§ 4-13 (1962), re-
printed in GasErzE DEs LANDES BADEN-W)R.TTEMBERG Stat. No. 51, at 3-5 (G. Dnirig ed. 1977).
39. Regarding the prosecutor's legally enforceable duty to prosecute, see p. 1563 and
note 54 infra.
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criminal proceedings, and the policeman was sentenced to a year's im-
prisonment for the offense.40
Goldstein and Marcus are misleading when they say that actions "to
redress grievances against the police ... are [seldom] brought, and they
are not likely to be successful."' If a system meant to deter abuse has
succeeded in its purpose, actions to remedy abuse ought to be relatively
infrequent. If every complaint is investigated, a considerable propor-
tion ought to be determined in favor of the policeman. Whether or
not the Germans have been as successful in deterring and punishing
police misconduct as most German legal academics and other law
professionals believe is a question that would reward careful and ex-
tensive empirical study. The generalities on which Goldstein and
Marcus rely do little to answer the question. Indeed, the only concrete
examples they mention are cases of successful prosecutions of police
officials in Augsburg.42 It is significant that where there are a press and
a parliamentary process as visible and outspoken as in modern
Germany, political discussion knows no real counterpart to the bitter
American debate about police abuse and exclusionary rules.
Goldstein and Marcus report, evidently on the basis of their inter-
views, that German prosecutors deny that they exercise the discretion
in bringing charges that is characteristic of an American prosecutor.
Nevertheless, they discount their own findings and conclude, that in
Germany as well as in the other systems they observed, prosecutorial
"[d]iscretion is exercised ... for reasons similar to those supporting it
in the United States.1 43 In truth, the Germans have been remarkably
successful in eliminating discretion from the prosecution of serious
crime.
The basic statutory design is straightforward. 44 Section 152(11) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure requires the German prosecutor to
40. Judgment of Aug. 31, 1961, 2d Grosse Strafkammer des Landgerichts Tilbingen,
KLs 15/61, aff'd, Nov. 28, 1961, 1st Strafsenat dcs Bundesgerichthofs, 457/61. We are
grateful to Professor Gunther Arzt, Erlangen University, who recollected the case from his
clerkship (Referendar) days, for obtaining copies of the judgments for us. The policeman
in this case was also convicted of two unrelated lesser counts of misconduct and sentenced
to a combined term of one year and one month. Departmental proceedings were, of course,
also taken.
41. Myth of Judicial Supervision at 261 (footnote omitted).
42. Id. at 261 n.55.
43. Id. at 280.
44. In the 1970s a substantial body of literature has been produced by or for Americans
explaining the purpose, the origins, and the operation of this scheme. See, e.g., Herrmann,
The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution and the Scope of Prosecutorial Discretion in
Germany, 41 U. Ci. L. Rav. 468 (1974); Jescheck, The Discretionary Powers of the Pros-
ecuting Attorney in West Germany, 18 AM. J. ComP. L. 508 (1970); Langbein, Con-
trolling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. Rv. 439 (1974).
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prosecute "all prosecutable offenses, to the extent that there is a suf-
ficient factual basis. '' 45 This so-called Legalitiitsprinzip, the rule of com-
pulsory prosecution, denies the German prosecutor all power to decline
to prosecute where criminal liability is provable. It is, however, limited
by section 153(I), which permits nonprosecution for misdemeanors
(Vergehen) if the culprit's guilt can "be regarded as minor" and "there
is no public interest in prosecuting. ' 46 All felonies (Verbrechen) and
all misdemeanors that cannot be excused under the two criteria of
pettiness must be prosecuted. 47
A crucial corollary of this system is that there can be no charge or
plea bargaining in cases of serious crime. The prosecutor who is duty-
bound to prosecute in every such case lacks authority, for example, to
offer to reduce the charge in return for a concession of guilt. The rule
of compulsory prosecution requires him to take the case to trial in its
strongest and most inclusive form.48 If he does not, the court is em-
powered to correct his error.49 And even if the accused admits his
guilt, a trial must be held at which proof will be taken to establish the
material facts.
German trial procedure is relatively rapid,50 so the prosecutor has
no particular incentive to try to avoid trial even if he could. The
prosecutor's pretrial dossier facilitates the trial, because the trial judge
works from it when he interrogates witnesses and the accused. The
prosecutor is under a duty to investigate thoroughly and impartially,
and the dossier contains exculpatory as well as inculpatory evidence. 51
45. STPO § 152(11) (1977).
46. Id. § 153(1).
47. There are a few exceptions provided by statute, of no quantitative importance,
collected in Langbein, supra note 44, at 458 nA8.
48. There is one inconsequential exception permitting nonprosecution of unimportant
collateral offenses "if the punishment ... to which [such prosecution] can lead is negligible
compared with a punishment ... imposed or anticipated against the accused for another
act." STPO § 154 (translated in J. LXNGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY
159 (1977)).
49. Id. § 206, discussed in J. LANGBEIN, supra note 48, at 9.
50. See J. LANGBEIN, supra note 48, at 77 (summarizing data from Casper & Zeisel, Lay
Judges in the German Criminal Courts, I J. LEG. STUD. 135, 149-51 (1972)).
51. This nonadversarial prosecutorial practice also bears importantly on another mis-
take in the Goldstein and Marcus article. The authors say: "The German prosecutor * * .
may take a case to trial without any prior formal proceedings; there is no analogue of a
preliminary hearing or a grand jury." Myth of Judicial Supervision at 262. In fact, German
procedure has rather a close analogue to the Anglo-American preliminary hearing, which
is called the Zwischenverfahren, literally the in-between procedure, in the sense of being
between pretrial investigation and trial. In this phase of the procedure, the trial judge
reviews the prosecutor's motion to require the accused to stand trial, STPO §§ 199-210
(1977), according to a standard that amounts to probable cause, id. § 203.
The code makes provision for the accused to contest the prosecutor's motion, and for
the court to investigate the submissions of the accused by a variety of means, including the
taking of evidence. While contested preliminary proceedings may be quantitatively less
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It is made available in advance of the trial to the accused and his de-
fense counsel5 2 who can by motion require the prosecutor to in-
vestigate defensive claims and evidence that he has overlooked on his
own. 53 Surprise and forensic strategy are largely eliminated from the
trial, which is usually straightforward and speedy.
Like the police, German prosecutors are members of a career service
with strictly meritocratic promotion standards. All decisions not to
prosecute are reviewable on citizen complaint (Dienstaufsichtsbe-
schwerde), and every complaint and its resolution are entered in the
relevant personnel files. Even in cases of a lesser misdemeanor where
the rule of compulsory prosecution does not apply, the citizen com-
plainant is entitled to review by the office of the state prosecutor-
general, which must issue a statement of reasons if the decision not to
prosecute is endorsedY4
Goldstein and Marcus present no evidence that the German rule of
compulsory prosecution is anything less than completely effective. They
point to no case in which a German prosecutor declined to prosecute
a serious crime when the evidence known to him would have sup-
ported conviction, and mention no report of such a case from those
whom they interviewed or from anyone else. Yet they assert:
Though prosecutors deny that they use evidentiary grounds to
conceal policy-motivated dismissals, the denials lose much of their
force when we consider the large number of cases dropped for lack
of evidence. In 1970, of 3.3 million reported cases, sixty-eight per-
cent were terminated by the prosecutor on such grounds. Even
important in German than in American practice, Goldstein and Marcus do not address
the main reason, which is well-known. German procedure aims to terminate unsupport-
able cases at the pretrial investigatory stage by imposing on the prosecutor the re-
sponsibility to investigate exculpatory as well as inculpatory circumstances. Id. § 160(1I).
The police have a similar responsibility. See id. § 136(II). Except in simple matters, the .
prosecutor is required to interview a suspect before bringing charges against him. Id.
§ 163a(I). The suspect who has an easy answer to the allegations against him will disclose
it then.
German defense lawyers interviewed by one of the authors report that they do not have
difficulty in getting prosecutors to investigate defensive contentions fully and that pros-
ecutors generally do decline to prosecute when exculpatory evidence demonstrates that
there is inadequate ground for making an accused stand trial. But when the prosecutor
does err in exercising his charging function, the Zwischenverfahren is available to the
accused to correct the error.
52. STPO § 147 (1977).
53. H. SCHORN, DER STRAFVERTEIDIGER: EIN HANDBUCH FUR DIE PRAXIS 116 (1966).
54. In cases of serious crime where the rule of compulsory prosecution does pertain,
the prosecutor may still decline to prosecute for want of adequate factual or legal basis.
However, in such cases the victim is entitled not only to departmental review but also to
judicial review by the state supreme court. These judicial proceedings to compel prosecu-
tion (Klageerzwingungsverfahren) are rare, because the statute requires that departmental
review precede judicial review, and most mistaken decisions not to prosecute are corrected
at the departmental level. See Langbein, supra note 44, at 463-66.
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though these figures include crimes reported to the police but not
solved, they point plainly to the exercise of some charging discre-
tion by the prosecutor.r5
These statistics, which Goldstein and Marcus attribute to an unpub-
lished and unofficial source, are highly misleading. The official pub-
lication, Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik, gives the figure of 2,413,586
reported crimes, including all felonies and all misdemeanors other than
traffic violations, for the same year.56 The vast majority of the cases not
cleared were relatively less serious misdemeanors affecting unguarded
property for which it is difficult to obtain evidence; for example, the
police cleared less than twenty percent of the 133,459 cases of bicycle
theft and 212,726 cases of theft of property from motor vehicles that
were reported to them. 57 Goldstein and Marcus present no evidence at
all that these statistics represent anything other than what they purport
to be, unsolved and preponderantly petty crimes. Yet the authors rely
on these figures for the proposition that German prosecutors are dis-
obeying the rule requiring them to prosecute all provable cases of
serious crime.
Goldstein and Marcus then shift the finger of suspicion back to the
police.58 Even if the prosecutor behaves, the police may dupe him,
since he will seldom second-guess their determination that a case should
be terminated for lack of evidence. But the authors do not mention any
case in which the police have pretended that evidence was unobtainable
when they in fact knew better. Of course, German police departments
exercise managerial discretion in allocating manpower to the exigencies
of the moment: murders receive more extensive investigation than
minor crimes. But Goldstein and Marcus have adduced nothing to
suggest that such discretion is exercised on any irrational, arbitrary, or
improper basis.
Goldstein and Marcus misconceive the scope and the institutional
context of the German rule of compulsory prosecution when they con-
clude that it "demands the impossible: full enforcement of the law in
a time of rising crime and fierce competition for resources." 59O The rule
55. Myth of Judicial Supervision at 275 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
56. There were also just under 2000 state security crimes. BUNDESKRIMINALAMT VIES-
BADEN, POLIZEILICHE KRIMINALSTATISTIK 1970, at 1, 31 (R. Holle ed. 1971). The larger figure
given by Goldstein and Marcus probably includes 900,000 traffic violations.
57. Id. at 14, 107.
58. Myth of Judicial Supervision at 275-76. Here, as they argue on another point about
France, the authors shore up an unsupported conjecture about the prosecutor with an
equally unsupported conjecture about the police. See note 31 supra.
59. Myth of Judicial Supervision at 280.
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of compulsory prosecution is limited by statute to cases of serious crime
precisely in order to take account of the factor of resource insufficiency
and to make the necessary adjustments in the morally less troublesome
sphere of lesser crime. 60 The rule of compulsory prosecution works as
smoothly as it does because proper incentives are created for the
professionals to obey it, and because prosecution is geared to an
efficient nonadversarial trial procedure that does not create pressure to
avoid ordinary trials in cases of serious crime.
Turning to lesser misdemeanors where the rule of compulsory
prosecution does not apply, Goldstein and Marcus describe the dis-
position of minor cases under the nontrial "penal order" procedure 6
as a "direct analogue of the American guilty plea." 62 They do not,
however, give adequate emphasis to the differences that weaken that
analogy. The penal order lacks characteristics that most people, includ-
ing so far as one can tell Goldstein and Marcus themselves, regard as
central to the American plea bargaining procedure. First, a penal order
is not available at all for a felony or serious misdemeanor-the im-
portant sphere of American plea bargaining.0 3 Second, there is no
bargaining; the accused is offered the disposition of a penal order on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis. Third, if the accused rejects disposition by a
penal order in favor of a trial, the prosecutor virtually never recom-
mends, nor does the court impose, a penalty higher than that contained
in the penal order. The accused is not pressured to waive his right to
trial by the threat of an increased sanction if he demands trial and is
convicted. 64 The likely analogue in this country is a ticket and fine for
speeding, which the motorist can either accept as a disposition or con-
60. STPO § 153 (1977).
61. The prosecutor moves in the local criminal court for the issuance of the penal
order. The prosecutor drafts the proposed order, and in theory the judge reviews the
file and the order before propounding the order as his own. In practice this review
is generally cursory, and the order customarily contains what the prosecutor has
proposed. The order has the form of a provisional judgment issued by the court:
"Unless you object by such-and-such date, you are hereby sentenced to such-and-such
criminal sanction(s) on account of such-and-such conduct which offends such-and-
such criminal proscription(s)." The document instructs the accused that if he makes
timely objection (within one week) he is entitled to a criminal trial. If he objects, the
penal order is nugatory and an ordinary criminal trial will take place as though the
penal order had never been issued.
Langbein, supra note 44, at 456.
62. Myth of Judicial Supervision at 267. The mechanical resemblance to the Anglro-
American guilty plea is noted in Jescheck, supra note 44, at 515, and LaUngbein, supra note
44, at 456.
63. See STPO § 407 (1977) (penal order procedure authorized only for offenses not
punishable with imprisonment). Until 1975 a maximum of six months' imprisonment could
be imposed under a penal order.
64. See Langbein, supra note 44, at 457.
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test, in which case he will have a trial. While most of us accept the fine
without contest, it would be odd indeed to regard the procedure as
involving plea bargaining. Like the American who declines to contest
a traffic ticket, the German who accepts a penal order may save himself
the cost and nuisance of trial, but he cannot affect the charge or the
sentence. Penal order procedure is a mode of prosecution, not a
vehicle for selective prosecution.
Only in its arrangements for conditional nonprosecution of petty
misdemeanors does German procedure admit any element of negotia-
tion in disposing of criminal charges. It will be recalled that section
153 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the prosecutor to
decline to prosecute in cases of provable criminal liability if the cul-
prit's guilt can be regarded as minor and there is no public interest in
prosecution. Section 153a allows the prosecutor to make such a dis-
position conditional on restitution to the victim or some other com-
parable act. Once again, however, the exercise of discretion is limited
to minor cases, 65 and the extent and manner of bargaining bear scant
resemblance to the negotiation of a plea of guilty to a felony in this
country.
As for cases of serious crime, Goldstein and Marcus perceive "a more
subtle analogue" 60 to our guilty plea in German trials in which the
accused does not dispute the main charges against him. "The uncon-
tested trial is brief; few witnesses are called; and the judge sees his task
in calling witnesses less as developing the facts than as confirming the
confession." 67 Of course a trial is likely to be shorter if the accused has
confessed. As the authors themselves state: "If there is no apparent
reason for the judge to question a witness closely and if there is no
encouragement from counsel or the parties for him to do so, the result
is a trial that is not especially probing and is unlikely to stray far from
65. Herrmann's study, on which Goldstein and Marcus rely, see Myth of Judicial
Supervision at 243 n.8, indicates that section 153a has been used essentially for traffic and
other trivial misdemeanors. Herrmann, supra note 44, at 489-93.
66. Myth of Judicial Supervision at 267.
67. Id. at 267-68. The reference to witnesses not being "called" is misleading. Unless
there is a pretrial confession in the dossier, the trial court does not know in advance
whether an accused will contest or not. The court will, therefore, summon all the
relevant witnesses. At the trial the accused is always heard first. If he then confesses, the
court will usually call only some of the potential witnesses, and if they confirm what the
accused has confessed the court will not call the others.
Casper and Zeisel measured trial time and deliberation time in a sample of over 500
German trials. In the 41% of their sample cases in which the accused confessed, they
found that less trial time was needed, but that "the differences are much smaller than one
would expect on the basis of American experience. The deliberation time differs hardly
at all, suggesting that the bulk of deliberation time [even in contested cases] is devoted to
the sentencing issue." Casper & Zeisel, suPra note 50, at 150.
1566
Vol. 87: 1549, 1978
HeinOnline  -- 87 Yale L.J. 1566 1977-1978
Continental Criminal Procedure
the dossier."6' 8 Such trials are simply as probing as the circumstances
require, bearing in mind the rule that all doubts are to be resolved in
favor of the accused. Goldstein and Marcus have no basis for the con-
clusion that such trials depart from "the full and independent judicial
inquiry promised by inquisitorial theory."69 When they liken such
trials to the rapid proceeding for "the taking of a guilty plea in an
increasing number of American jurisdictions," 70 they seem to treat a
case in which guilt is clear as if it were, somehow by definition, a case
in which guilt is not proved.
As we have indicated, to a considerable extent Goldstein and
Marcus are themselves captives of the myths they seek to explode. No
practitioner or scholar in the countries they visited would assert that
the procedures followed in the large majority of routine cases include
the elaborate and extended investigative and adjudicative processes that
characterize the most difficult and serious cases. If such a misconcep-
tion can indeed be derived from some of the writings in English that
Goldstein and Marcus exclusively quote, there is all the more reason
not to rely only on such sources for descriptions of what actually oc-
curs. We confess that we are baffled by an article in which the authors
purport to describe the criminal procedures of three foreign countries,
but refer to none of the literature of those countries and acknowledge
that they have not even "reviewed" the foreign literature.71 They
68. Myth of Judicial Supervision at 266.
69. Id. at 266-67.
70. Id. at 268.
71. Id. at 245 n.16. The authors explain their disregard of French, German, and Italian
literature with the observation that scholars in those countries confirmed "the view that
there is little or no empirical description comparable to that available about the American
system." Id. While full-dress empirical studies have not been made in those countries as
often as they are here, the foreign literature is far from barren of material that describes
actual practices, often critically.
For France, examples of readily available sources of such material are ASSOCIATION
NATIONALE DES AVOCATS DE FRANCE ET DE LA COMMUNAUTE, LE BARREAU FACE Aux PROBLEMES
ACTUELS DE LA JUSTICE PENALE (1969); A. MELLOR, LES GRANDS PROBLEMES CONTEMPORAINS
DE L'INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE (1952). There are many legal periodicals and publications of
lawyers' and officials' professional associations that publish articles about criminal pro-
cedure, among which can regularly be found some that discuss concrete current problems.
The Revue de Science Criminelle et de Droit Penal Compard publishes a bibliography of
current writing. Several publications, including Recueil Dalloz Sirey and La Semaine
Juridique, accompany the text of current legislation with a list of references to related
legislative documents (iravaux prdparatoires), such as commission reports; those relating
to criminal procedure are a source of considerable information. In addition, the standard
general treatises, such as R. MERLE 9- A. VITU, supra note 10, and G. STEFANI & G. LEvASSEUR,
supra note 10, as well as more specialized works, e.g., P. CHAMBON, LE JUGE D'INsTRUcTION
(1972), and the large number of practice manuals for lawyers and officials, are perhaps too
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evidently made scant observations of their own in each of the countries
and rely for their conclusions on interviews framed in advance on the
basis of the literature in English, which they themselves say contains
little except descriptions of the criminal codes. 72 We wonder how
seriously they would receive an article about American criminal pro-
cedure written in French by a Frenchman who had read none of the
literature available in this country and whose personal observations
were similarly limited.
Because we agree with Goldstein and Marcus that the time may be
propitious for a critical assessment of criminal procedure in this
country, we believe that the matters they discuss in their article are of
considerable importance. We agree emphatically that the issues ought
not be framed as a choice between "the adversarial model" and "the
inquisitorial model, ' 73 especially if the two models are presented as
theoretical abstractions unrelated to the conditions in which they are
or might be realized. The point made at the conclusion of their
article-that any procedures that we devise must allow the relatively
swift, summary disposition of most cases and must reserve painstaking
and costly procedures for the few that are unusual, because of their
seriousness or complexity or the inconclusiveness of readily available
evidence7 4-is correct, and it is fundamental to any effort to improve
our criminal process. All of that is, indeed, borne out by the experience
elsewhere.
On the other hand, we think there is far more to be learned from
other countries' experience, particularly that of France and Germany
much oriented to the codes for common-law tastes, but there is much to be learned from
them about the systems they describe.
The major German treatises on criminal procedure collect and organize citations to
the case law and to a vast periodical, monographic, and Festschrift literature. L6WE-RosCN-
BERG, DIE STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG UND DAS GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ (22d ed. 1971-74) (3
vols.); E. SCHMIDT, LEHRKOMMENTAR ZUR STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG UND ZUM GERICHTSVER-
FASSUNGSGESErZ (3 vols. & Supps. 1957-70). The one-volume work that professionals typically
carry with them in court, T. KLEINKNECHT, STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG (33d ed. 1977), is a
marvel of concision. Two leading journals specialize in criminal law and procedure,
Zeitschrift fiir die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft and Goltdammer's Archiv fiir Strafrecht.
Further, the leading general law journals such as Juristenzeitung and Neue Juristisce
Wochenschrift contain frequent reportage and criticism of developments in the field. For
outstanding examples of German empirical work on aspects of criminal procedure, see E.
K..USA, EHRENAMTLICHE RICHTER: SHRE AUSWAHL UND FUNKTION, EMPIRISCH UNTERSUCHT
(1972) (concerning selection of lay judges in criminal and other courts) and K. PETERS,
FEHLERQUELLEN IM STRAFPROZESS (1970-74) (3 vols.) (concerning cases reopened after judg-
ment upon discovery of new evidence, etc.). A recent monograph on the rule of com-
pulsory prosecution collects in its bibliography about 150 German titles that the book's
author found worth consulting. T. WEIGEND, ANKLAGEPFLICHT UND ERMESSEN 193-99 (1978).
72. Myth of Judicial Supervision at 245.
73. Id. at 283.
74. Id.
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which we know best, than Goldstein and Marcus allow. Summary pro-
cedures for determining guilt are not necessarily all alike just because
they are the primary means of disposing of large numbers of cases. It
is no less important to ask which system "more fairly and accurately
searches out the truth" 75 when we are comparing modes of simple,
swift process than when we are comparing more painstaking pro-
cedures. We do not suppose that Goldstein and Marcus believe other-
wise. Yet along with their dismissal of a comparison of unreal proto-
types, they seem very nearly to dismiss a comparison of what actually
takes place.
Much as we are encouraged by the effort to learn about criminal
process elsewhere, we are also dismayed by the assumption that ob-
servations can be made accurately and interpreted without laying
aside preconceptions engendered by the procedures we want to im-
prove. It is simply pointless to study practices different from our own
if one is guided by an a priori assumption that after all they cannot be
very different. We do not ask for uncritical acceptance of foreign judg-
ments that other procedures are preferable to ours. We do not assume
that the social values and objectives that determine the criminal pro-
cess abroad are in all respects the same as ours or that even when they
are, what works elsewhere must work for us as well. We do believe that
it is significant that dissatisfaction with criminal justice is greater and
deeper at all levels, professional and public, in this country than it is in
Western Europe; we believe that it is foolish and dangerous to suppose
that the whole explanation for our dissatisfaction can be found in a
greater commitment to the ideal of justice or a more acute perception
of reality. If we look elsewhere expecting to find only what is familiar,
our expectations will easily be confirmed. We shall, then, all too com-
fortably confuse the familiar with the necessary.
75. Id.
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